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The meteoric rise in share values in Dot.Com companies and then their equally spectacular 
fall is a well-documented example of a bubble (Graph). During it asset values altered 
spectacularly although most of the companies concerned were always and quite transparently 
losing money1.  
 
No complex theory is required to understand why anyone wishes to possess what he or she 
thinks is a very valued object at a bargain price nor is one required to understand the 
motivation to dispose of an object that is felt likely to fall in value. But how could stock 
prices vary to the extent that what is so highly valued at one moment is so unwanted at 
another? Standard economic theory supposes share valuations will generally reflect supply 
and demand based on investor calculations of future rates of return indicated by underlying 
accounting realities. Standard finance theory supposes that calculations of future returns will 
be based on assessments of underlying business realities – assessments for the demand for 
products, costs, price/earnings ratios, etc.  
 
It can be argued that because the Dot.com companies were engaging in new activity this 
introduced uncertainty into forecasts as to how much profit they would generate. 
Nonetheless, on most theories valuations should not vary in an extreme way especially across 
a large part of the market, unless alterations in valuation can be tied to material events 
altering underlying calculations2. Equilibrium in capital markets is achieved because 
investors are all solving what amounts to a constrained maximization problem in which 
arbitrage opportunities are provided in only a limited way by the conditions of imperfect 
information and uncertainty. While some investors would be expected to miscalculate future 
returns upwards or downwards these “errors” should have little effect on the price.  Prices 
                                            
1  For example, Priceline.com, an Internet company where people could name their price for airline tickets, 
had been in business for less than a year losing three times its $35m revenues and was employing fewer 
than 200 people at the time of its IPO, March 30th 1999.  Its stock rose by 330% on its first day of trading, 
closing at $69 and valuing the company at almost $10bn, more than the market capitalisation of United 
Airlines, Continental Airlines and Northwest Airlines combined.  A few weeks later its stock reached $150, 
at which point this tiny company was worth more than the entire US airline industry.  Its stock was trading 
in September 2001 at less than $2 – one thirtieth of its first day close. Meanwhile, Priceline.com continues 
in operation successfully albeit at a modest level, obtaining for its users cheap airline tickets and similar 
commodities in an innovative way. Other stock in companies offering similar products followed a similar 
course. 
2  For instance a pharmaceutical product supporting a high share price could prove unsafe or a new method 
inefficacious. By contrast what caused the dot.com collapse seems to have been a long article in Barrons on 
March 18 2000, 8 days after the Dow Jones Internet Index all-time high, entitled “Burning up”… This 
article collected and presented in a new way data long available and concluded that at least a quarter would 
run out of cash within a year.  
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should be based on the many unrelated individual calculations of atomistically conceived 
investors. When large numbers of investors and financial institutions appeared to have 
miscalculated together we are presented with a theoretical anomaly. In this paper we wish to 
propose that in fact an understanding of the dot.com affair shows that existing theories are 
insufficient to explain how investors are reaching their valuations and to suggest that 
valuation theory, if it is to reach a fuller explanation, needs some additional tools that can be 
garnered from the psychoanalytic theory of psychic reality. 
 
Previous authors have sought to explain price bubbles in terms of the impact of positive 
feedback (Shliefer, 2000 ch 6; Shiller, 2000 ch 3) and of herd effects (Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer and Welch, 1998) on investor behaviour. The essence of these theories is to 
suggest that investors make choices by imitating the decisions others are observed to be 
making, not on the basis of reaching their own judgement independently3. We will attempt to 
add to these theories and to extend them.  
 
Over many months during the Dot,com bubble shares in the Internet sector became so 
desirable to possess that investor valuations of them were sustained despite their values being 
extraordinarily out of line with the underlying balance sheet realities that were well known at 
the time. Any adequate theory must account for how prices could remain so high so 
tenaciously - particularly given what was well known about the accounting realities of shares 
in this sector, which were frequently the topic of readily available sceptical analysis and 
comment. We suggest the Dot.com experience makes it necessary to consider the causal role 
of some hitherto not considered psychoanalytical (non-cognitive) psychological factors in 
studying investor valuations and provides a striking opportunity to explore them. 
 
We hypothesise that the main explanation for what happened to investors buying and selling 
shares during the dot.com bubble is that they became caught up emotionally in their activity. 
They were first mainly driven by compelling and exciting emotions and then by terrifying 
and shameful ones. In each case these emotions, amplified by their experience as members of 
                                            
3  Maynard Keynes argued famously that assessing which stocks will do well in future is like being asked to 
bet on the outcome of a beauty contest held by judging 100 photographs in a newspaper. Judgement of such 
a contest only very loosely depends on which individual an individual believes is the most beautiful. Rather 
what we as punters have to devote “our intelligences to anticipating is what average opinion expects the 
average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practise the fourth, fifth and higher degrees” 
(1936: 156).  
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a group caught up in a particular collective behaviour4, dominated and distorted investors’ 
cognitive capacities in a way in which they were only partly aware. In fact in unconscious 
psychic reality5 Internet stocks became subjectively mentally represented as what we will 
describe as infantile “phantastic”6 objects. We suggest this explains the way possessing such 
stock became so charged and exciting that investor behaviour departed in an extreme way 
from that defined by the usual homo economicus valuation theorems. Our theory will allow 
us to link the first process of excited over-valuation and seeking to possess Internet shares, 
which is observed during the upturn, to the subsequent process of disillusion and panicky 
disposal during the downturn – the severity and extent of the second process is predictable 
from a psychoanalytic perspective, because the first process involves individuals 
unconsciously treating “external7” objects concretely as “phantastic” ones and then 
attempting defensively to deny to themselves this is what they are doing.  
 
“A Psychoanalytic Theory of Mental Objects”  
The starting point for our thesis is that in psychic reality Internet stock certificates became 
more than unusually highly desirable because in conveying ownership of a dot.com company 
they became, in a compelling and hard to resist way, a particular type of “phantastic object” 
for investors; one felt able, magically, to be capable of transforming an individual from a 
normal kind of existence into a super one. The transformation corresponds to one 
                                            
4  Neil Smelser (1963, 2000), a psychoanalyst and sociologist, uses the term “collective” behaviour to 
understand common social and psychological factors influencing a number of different historical incidents 
– stock market bubbles, crazes, panics, fads, political movements etc.  
5  Psychic or Psychical reality is “a term often used by Freud to designate whatever in the subject’s psyche 
presents a consistency and resistance comparable to those displayed by material reality; fundamentally, 
what is involved here is unconscious desire and its associated phantasies” (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973: 
363). 
6  What exactly we mean by a “phantastic” object is subtle and will be developed later (p 7 et seq), but we 
have in mind an object of perception whose qualities are primarily determined by an individual’s 
unconscious beliefs or phantasies. The term “phantasy” is a technical one implying the existence of 
organised unconscious ideation – “an imaginary scene in which the subject is a protagonist, representing the 
fulfilment of a wish (in the last analysis, an unconscious wish) in a manner that is distorted to a greater or 
lesser extent by defensive processes” (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973: 314). It is, therefore, a technical term 
more specific that the commonly used word “fantasy” which tends to denote notions of whimsy or 
eccentricity. In psychoanalytic thinking unconscious phantasies are the driving force of all significant 
human subjective experience. 
7  Speaking psychoanalytically an “external” object of perception is one whose qualities and function are not 
primarily given by factors dependent on an individual’s imaginary beliefs. It is equivalent to what is loosely 
termed “objective” or material reality. 
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psychoanalysts suggest is wished for in early human mental development, and by being 
retained unconsciously never entirely given up.8  
 
Our reasons for thinking it useful to understand the valuation process in the case of Internet 
stocks in terms of a theory of unconscious mental representation rest on examining what was 
happening in psychic reality in five different phases of the dot.com affair.  
 
First, we propose that Internet stocks were quite easily represented in the minds of investors 
as alluring phantastic objects because this is how they seem to have struck those who 
publicised their existence, as they emerged into public view in the first “boom” phase of the 
bubble.  
 
Second, we think that as “phantastic objects” they stimulated a headlong euphoric craze in 
the second phase of the bubble because they had a particular power to stimulate further 
compulsive behaviour driven by unconscious intergenerational as well as intragenerational 
rivalry.  
 
Third, and crucially, we consider they could remain for many months tenaciously valued in a 
contrarian way, despite growing evidence that this might be foolish, because when the normal 
valuation criteria of material reality are applied to phantastic objects they are not necessarily 
salient, due to the specific ways phantasy representations are maintained in psychic reality.  
 
Fourth, we think the value of Internet stock disappeared over night not just because everyone 
was selling them but because they had gone so absurdly high that once the contrarian logic 
holding the price up was no longer underpinned by their unconscious status as revered 
                                            
8  The reader who has observed small children will probably concur that most of them want to change from 
feeling small, powerless and frequently frustrated by those on whom they depend into feeling magically and 
all-powerfully big and strong and possessed of endless supplies of satisfaction. Still more strongly, infants 
(who cannot yet speak) appear to wish to be transformed from being greedy needy and dependent into the 
object of their greed, their mother or parts of her body that they desire. In coming to terms with reality 
during development such wishes create guilt and anxiety or become felt as childish and shameful. They are 
gradually and painfully more or less given up or at least their unrealistic aspects are made unconscious, a 
process aided by actual mental and physical maturation, learning, social rules, and real achievement of 
greater capacity. From this point of view we are suggesting that owning Internet stocks can be considered to 
represent, in the unconscious mind of investors, achieving the desired and never given up possession of the 
most long desired and imagined infantile objects, the highly charged and totally satisfying objects of the 
infant’s early stages of psychic emotional development ownership of which in unconscious phantasy 
convey a blissful state of omnipotence and omniscience.  
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phantastic objects, Internet stocks became hated and despised objects, actually felt to have let 
down their owners and potentially to stigmatise them.  
 
Fifth and finally, once widely disposed of in the terminal phase, Internet stock can be seen as 
lost phantastic objects, which create psychic pain, which is hard to bear. A consequence is 
that investors may have wished to forget all about their previous “phantasies” and not to wish 
to be reminded of them. This may create prejudice against valuing the sector rationally 
subsequently with implications for companies remaining in this sector and for learning from 
the experience.  
   
1. Emerging to be viewed 
There were only a handful of Internet companies before the Netscape launch in August 1995, 
which began the boom. Very few people had previously invested in them or known about 
them. However, Netscape’s share price rose over 100% on its offer price by the close of the 
first day’s trading valuing Netscape at $2.2bn, or about as much as General Dynamics, the 
giant defence contractor.  Its shares changed hands almost three times on average during the 
day; the launch and the news of the success of the launch somehow captured the public 
imagination and in consequence everyone involved with the IPO had immediately become 
enormously rich.  
 
The Netscape launch and its huge success propelled the owners of Internet stock into the 
public gaze and seems to have created an exciting spectacle containing a particularly alluring 
new object. Certainly what happened created great media interest. As one example, Marc 
Andreessen of Netscape appeared as barefoot on the cover of Time (February 19, 1996) with 
the associated article portraying him as a modest tycoon-cum-superman with whom ordinary 
investors could identify. Similar media coverage seems likely to have helped to create a 
heady emotional climate.  Then, two months later Steve Case, America Online’s 37 year old 
chairman, appeared on the front of Business Week (April 15, 1996) lying on top of a pile of 
its diskettes together with appropriately eulogistic copy in the accompanying article. Other 
early and still limited in number Internet stock entrepreneurs achieved similar celebration, 
attracting great interest and being presented as charismatic figures and stars. In this way they 
became the owners of exhibitable objects, ones they might appear to be showing off, and with 
great new powers.   
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The new powers associated with Internet companies were certainly the subject of further 
public claims of a particular significant type: they seemed to transform ordinary and more 
limited reality. For example, two weeks after the Netscape IPO Forbes (August 28, 1995) 
anointed Marc Andreessen, Netscape’s founder, as the new Bill Gates and claimed that the 
Internet would “displace both the telephone and the telephone over the next five years or so.”  
These comments supported and were supported by what was happening to share prices. Four 
months after Netscape’s launch its share price was six times its offer price, valuing the 
company at $6.5bn. 
 
Internet companies were new and appeared to offer new methods of doing business. Before 
the crash it is striking to notice the excited and contemptuous tone of the dismissal of “old” 
ways of doing things. Internet companies, for instance, were hailed as part of a new economy 
whereas non-internet businesses were on the way out. These views were born out by what 
was happening to share prices9 and an extraordinarily excited set of claims to the superiority 
of these approaches then circulated.  
 
For instance, Time (July 20, 1998) offered a headline above a cover picture of Jerry Yang, the 
founder of Yahoo!: “Kiss Your Mall Goodbye: Online Shopping Is Faster, Cheaper and 
Better.” (Cassidy, 2002, p. 172) Similarly, an article in Business Week commenting on 
Amazon.com’s 1998 results pointed out: “Amazon’s fourth-quarter sales nearly quadrupled 
over 1997, and compared to that, Sears is dead” (italics added). Likewise, Josh Harris, the 
founder of Pseudo.com, a fledgling online television network, interviewed by CBS reported 
his aim was “…to take you guys out of business.  I’m in a race to take CBS out of business.” 
(Cassidy, 2002, p. 276). 
 
Still more astonishingly Rufus Griscom, the cofounder of Nerve.com in a New York cover 
story on Silicon Valley’s “Early True Believers” was quoted as saying: It’s incredibly 
powerful to feel you are one of seventeen people who really understand the world.”  (Quoted 
                                            
9  Consider the following two stories: 1. Yahoo!, with just 68 employees, listed on Nasdaq on April 12th, 
1996. Its stock closed that day at two and a half times its issue price valuing the company at 100 times its 
previous year’s sales.  By early 2000 Yahoo! was worth more than Walt Disney and News Corporation 
combined with a stockmarket valuation of $132bn and a P/E ratio of no less than 2150.  2. 
Amazon.com. IPO was on May 15th 1997. Its prospectus showed that it was losing $9 on every book sold 
but its shares sold spectacularly.  Its market capitalisation eventually peaked at around $37bn in December 
1999, more than sixty times its value when it listed, and despite forecast losses for that year of $720m.   
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in New York magazine, March 6, 2000; Cassidy, 2002, p. 276) No being left out, not 
knowing, waiting, developing, learning, grinding, normal reality there. Omniscience! 
 
As it was reported and played out in the financial press, television and general media, the 
progress of dot.com businesses in fact became an exciting spectacle, with the companies’ 
executives presented as supernatural stars. This attention seems likely to have amplified 
exponentially the psychological desirability of Internet stock by exhibiting them so 
tantalisingly and so openly: they became phantastic objects – super, new, exhibitable, not to 
mention enriching.   
 
Moreover, the new Internet could itself be used to buy these stocks:  you could use it to buy 
it. Almost anyone could know about and buy Internet stock paper so that possession of these 
phantastic objects seemed particularly open to everyone. Almost everyone’s unconscious 
wishes could now, apparently, be fulfilled and, it seems to us, this created a powerful yet 
subtle group pressure on anyone in contact with it.  
 
Our argument is that in phantasy the Internet stock boom meant to many that anyone could 
now be publicly possessed of what could be imagined as the “Real Thing”.  In psychoanalytic 
terms this means much more than just becoming potentially wealthy. By holding stock in 
these companies investors perhaps felt themselves actually endowed with the qualities of 
their inventors, part of a magic circle of people who were “in” on the new. In this and other 
ways possessing stock was like possessing the primary phantastic objects of childhood in a 
primary identification10. The sense one possesses a “phantastic object” would make an 
investor (in phantasy) into the sort of person all desired.  In this way it would be felt11, 
actually to reverse the many slights of childhood and turn the unconsciously never-forgotten 
experience of being a powerless and dependent infant into the mental phantasy of the all-
powerful big man (or woman) who can do anything. The same phantasy turns the baby, who 
doesn’t have uncontrolled access to his mother’s breast (metaphorically) into the one who 
possesses it. It turns the child excluded from the parental couple in the bedroom into one who 
is right in the middle, able to see and do anything.  In imagination this phantasy creates the 
                                            
10  “Primitive mode of the constitution of the subject on the model of the other person…” (Laplanche and 
Pontalis, 1973: 336) 
11  The psychoanalytic approach to subjective experience concentrates on feelings as operating mentally 
separately from cognition. One may “feel” one has “it” while retaining perfectly clear cognitive capacities, 
which if salient would allow one to see this is a gross exaggeration.  
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mental impression one can at last circumvent the more mundane facts of ordinary life and 
achieve magical powers: a possibly alluring possibility compared to the hard slow work of 
learning to wait, to grow up, to accumulate skills and to create value in material reality. 
 
2. The Rush to Possess: introducing intergenerational and intragenerational rivalry 
As the owners of Internet stock multiplied and hence became more and more viewable the 
impression seemed to grow up and to become the object of attention not only that they used a 
new technology but that they were part of something “phantastic” called the “new economy” 
which was organised along different rules and principles than the old. The earlier quotes from 
Business Week, Time and New York magazine have emphasised the claims being made by 
the entrepreneurs on their behalf but many other commentators took up these ideas and 
developed them.  
 
From a psychoanalytic point of view these claims and the level of emotional excitement 
signal a state of Oedipal triumph and a perverse reversal of generational difference12 or the 
“triumph of the short way over the long way” (Chasseguet, 2001)13.  Instead of the relatively 
ordinary process of internalising the qualities of desired parental objects and their creativity 
and aspiring through growth to be “like them” it was apparently now possible actually to 
become the ideal.  The possibility of possessing the phantastic objects was a seductive 
temptation allowing a sense of triumph over the normal sense of reality for which we all 
struggle14.  
 
                                            
12  The Oedipus Complex, so named after the ancient Greek play Oedipus Rex,  refers to an “organized body 
of loving and hostile wishes the child experiences towards its parents.” Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973: 282. 
It plays a fundamental part in the structuring of the personality, and in the orientation of desire as well as in 
the conscious and unconscious ambivalent relationships between the generations.  
13  Psychological maturity is hard won “the long way” by renouncing incestuous wishes – the perverse 
temptation or the “short way” (Chasseguet, 2001).  “When the child comes to recognize the complementary 
nature of his parents' genitality, he is reduced to feelings of his own smallness and inadequacy.  Recognition 
of the difference between the sexes is thus bound up with recognition of the difference between the 
generations. The perverse temptation leads one to accept pregenital desire and satisfactions (attainable by 
the small boy) as being equal, or even superior, to genital desires and satisfactions (attainable only by the 
father).  Erosion of the double difference between the sexes and the generations is the pervert's objective.  
He is generally helped to reach it by his mother who, by her seductive attitude towards him and her 
corresponding rejection of his father, fosters in him the illusion that he has neither to grow up nor to reach 
maturity taking his father as a model in order to be her satisfactory partner. (Chasseguet, 1983) 
14  “The bedrock of reality is created by the difference between the sexes and the difference between 
generations:  the inevitable period of time separating a boy from his mother (for whom he is an inadequate 
sexual partner) and from his father (whose potent adult sexual organ he does not possess). “(Chasseguet, 
1983) 
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Of course, as in the emotional state described as mania the process fed on its own 
momentum. While it was in full swing, optimism about valuation further stimulated the 
demand for stocks and so raised the price and increased the excitement. Normal checks on 
investor excesses were somehow overcome during the dot.com euphoria so that the events of 
the period look like a charismatic led Dionysian orgy, throwing down the walls of tradition 
and order with striking parallels to that described by Euripides in the Bacchae. The usual 
stigma or doubt associated with very excited or particularly risky investor behaviour seemed 
not only to depart but actually to be ridiculed15.  
 
Altogether between August 1995 and October 1998 there were another 69 dot.com IPOs with 
the Nasdaq increasing in line with the Dow Jones, both up by around 75% over this period.  
This “boom” stage of the bubble was characterised by the entrenchment of the idea that the 
US economy was being transformed by information technology and, in particular, the 
Internet. The argument was made that the old rules of economics no longer applied and that 
in these new types of investment traditional earnings-driven valuation methods could not be 
used.16   
 
From a psychoanalytic perspective this emphasis on the “new” would have intensified the 
allure of Internet stock as “phantastic objects” and encouraged what would normally be 
considered perverse or dangerous practices. The new entrepreneurs were manifestly young 
and apparently also subject to different rules – unveiling a kind of adolescent paradise and 
stimulating the unconscious processes surrounding the rivalry that exists between 
generations: the desire of the young to rival their parents and the fear of the parents at being 
left behind. Whereas children tend to feel left out of what the parents are doing (the primal 
scene17) it now seemed the parents might envy and feel left out by their children, a powerful 
dynamic normally restricted to the phantasies of children. This impression of a reversal of 
                                            
15  For example, The Economist (April 18, 1998) and the Financial Times (April 22, 1998) contained sceptical 
articles describing the US as experiencing a serious asset price bubble.  In response the New York Times 
published an editorial defending the nation’s amour-propre (April 29, 1998) and Newsweek dismissively 
poked fun at The Economist article (May 11, 1998). 
16  For example, see the series of articles, by Michael Mandel, a Harvard PhD in Economics and Business 
Week economics editor arguing there was a New Economy entitled “The Triumph of the New Economy”, 
“The New Business Cycle” and “The New Growth Formula” (Business Week, December 1996,  March 31, 
1997, p. 58 and  May 19, 1997, pp. 31-33 respectively).  In the latter case he argued that the new ways in 
which computers could be used could lead to good times “for the foreseeable future.” 
17  The imagined highly charged scene of sexual intercourse between the parents from which the child is 
usually excluded (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973: 335). This scene is also the unconscious mental template 
for all experience of “spectacles”, whether as participant or spectator. 
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generations seems to have been accentuated by the reaction of various authorities. At this 
time if the object of speculation had anything to do with the Internet the underlying situation 
was apparently so exciting it could not be defined as speculation at all. Moreover, one of the 
most influential public proponents of the Internet New Economy doctrine was Alan 
Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank18, which seems likely to have lent 
authoritative and perhaps moral legitimation to these new ways of thinking. Instead of 
seeking to control the speculation, Alan Greenspan and the Federal Reserve took the view 
that what was happening in 1998 was good for everyone.  Also, as another example, of 
changes in the culture of risk control, whereas it had been usual previously for top investment 
banks to avoid high-risk issuers to protect their valuable “reputational capital”, Internet IPOs 
eventually became over 40% more likely to be underwritten by one of the six most 
prestigious underwriters (Schultz and Zaman, 2001). 
 
Unchecked19, the headlong rush to possess Internet stock became matched to a stampede to 
become associated in almost anyway with it: the euphoric stage of the boom in which it 
seems nobody could afford to be left out20. Those who did not join in lost out on the gains 
that others were making and in the case of fund managers and analysts under-performed and 
so were at risk to lose their jobs. Between October 1998, when Dow Jones launched the Dow 
Jones Internet Composite Index, and the end of March 2000 no fewer than 325 Internet IPOs 
took place, or an average of 18 a month compared with under 2 a month over the previous 
three years.  From October 1st 1998, when the Dow Jones Internet Index stood at 72, to 
March 10th 2000 when it peaked at 510, its monthly rate of increase was almost 12%.  Its 
600% increase over this period was exactly twice as great as the broader based Nasdaq  
                                            
18  E.g. See Alan Greenspan Monetary Policy Testimony and Report to the Congress, July 22nd 1997.  Alan 
Greenspan will go down in the history books as the Fed chairman who oversaw the greatest speculative 
boom and bust that the US has ever seen ….He wasn’t the only person responsible for the Internet bubble 
but his actions encouraged and prolonged the speculative mania.”  (“A saint or a sucker”, The Financial 
Times, March 2/3, 2002, p. 10) 
19  The psychoanalytic concept of the Super-Ego as an internal source of control over untrammelled and 
dangerous desire and based on the capacity to internalise parental figures is implicit here (Laplanche and 
Pontalis, 1973: 435).  
20  “…there are great fundamental reasons to own these stocks ....The companies underneath are (1) growing 
amazingly quickly, and (2) threatening the status quo in multiple sectors of the economy ….With these 
types of investments, we would also argue that the ‘real’ risk is not losing some money – it is missing a 
much bigger upside.”  Henry Blodget, Internet/Electronic Commerce Report, Merrill Lynch, March 9, 
1999.” 
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technology index, whereas the Dow Jones Composite only increased by 20% over the same 
period.21  
 
Among the 325 new issues in this period, average first day returns over the euphoria period 
were around 90% (Schultz and Zaman, 2001).  In fact companies were now coming to the 
market with business models that by the normal rules might have seemed completely 
implausible. Significantly, although this was being made explicit in offer documents, it did 
not dampen enthusiasm.  A particularly striking example is given by Cassidy (2002 pp. 204-
5), who discusses Healtheon, which planned to outdo what had defeated many before: “fix 
the US health care system.” Despite meeting scepticism and considerable adverse publicity 
when trading started on February 10 1999 the stock closed at 4 times its offer price, valuing 
Healtheon at more than $2bn.   
 
In fact, looked at with the benefit of hindsight many, if not most, of the companies formed 
and brought to the market at this time were ideas or concepts which amounted to little more 
than clever names.  At the time, however, under the influence, we suggest, of an experience 
of encountering “phantastic objects” and faced with offer documents which did not anticipate 
profits for a considerable length of time, analysts were faced with a problem. They had the 
unexciting or even depressing option to regard them as worthless or had to find some way to 
value them that would, as the boom and then euphoria progressed, justify the market’s 
valuations and show the prices paid by investors were reasonable.   
 
We have mentioned that the new companies used new technology and an atmosphere of 
innovation was in the air. The idea, therefore, arose not to concentrate on such “old 
                                            
21  The kind of thing that was happening to valuations is illustrated by the story of  three examples: (1) At 
Home listed on Nasdaq two months after Amazon.com.  This “broadband” Internet business had just 5,000 
subscribers when it announced it was going public and warned that “there can also be no assurance that the 
Company will ever achieve profitability”. Nonetheless, At Home’s opening market capitalisation was no 
less than $2bn, reflecting a price to sales ratio of 1350 times; in due course its market capitalisation reached 
$22bn.  (2) eToys was floated on Nasdaq on May 20th 1999.  By the end of the first day of trading its price 
was up 280%, valuing the company at 220 times its revenues, or $7.8bn, substantially exceeding the market 
capitalisation of the successful and hitherto highly profitable Toys’R’Us shop, with sales almost 400 times 
larger.  At its peak, eToys was valued at well over $10bn, despite losing $4 on every order, even ignoring 
marketing costs. (3) Webvan was an on-line grocery home delivery business which filed for an IPO in early 
August 1999, just two months after it started selling groceries. Its prospectus expected losses of over half a 
billion dollars between 1999 and 2001!  Nonetheless, when Webvan finally listed on November 5th 1999 its 
stock rose by two thirds on the offer price, valuing the firm at $8bn, 20,000 times its annualised revenues. 
The claims and the valuations proved hopelessly unrealistic. At Home filed for bankruptcy at the end of 
September 2001, eToys declared its shares worthless in February 2001 and Webvan filed for Chapter 11 in 
July 2001. 
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economy” measures as earnings and revenues but on new concepts such as “mind share” and 
“market share” and these were to be quantified in terms of “website traffic”.  The Internet  
“..has all introduced a brave new world for valuation methodologies. …we believe that we 
have entered a new valuation zone”, was the argument of one influential analyst, Mary 
Meeker22.   
 
In the emotional climate we have described, this idea that Internet stock did require a 
radically new valuation method seems to have caught on to an extraordinary extent. Demeris 
and Lev (2001) compared the relative valuation models for an Internet company in 1999 and 
2000 and show how investors were favourably disposed towards Internet companies’ 
aggressive cash expenditures in 1999. The more their sample firms lost in 1999, the higher 
their share price to sales figures.  Hand (2000) also shows for a large sample of Internet firms 
from the first quarter of 1997 until the third quarter of 2000 that their stocks were priced in a 
contrarian way.  While reported profits were positively valued, losses were negatively 
priced, i.e. the larger the losses the greater the market value.  Hand argues that the 
stockmarket in this period treated losses as intangible investments in the future growth of the 
firm, considering the source of the losses as being due to high R&D and sales and marketing 
expenses. 
 
The evidence is that for over two years it was the dot.com suffix that was magic. Cooper, 
Dimitrov and Rau (2001) demonstrate dramatic increases in the value of firms which added 
“.com” to their names in 1998 and 1999, which increase in firm value appeared permanent.  
Specifically, they found cumulative abnormal returns of no less than 63% for the five days 
around the name-change announcement date and most notably with the effect independent of 
a company’s actual level of involvement with the Internet.  Moreover, their paper provides 
evidence that sample companies with non-Internet related core businesses earned the greatest 
post-announcement returns!  To us this suggests that it was mere association with the Internet 
(the phantastic object) that provided a firm with an aura and a large and ongoing value 
increase. We suggest it offered that special sense of primary identification and possession of 
                                            
22  Mary Meeker, US and the American Investment Research, Morgan Stanley Dean Whittler, September 16 
1997, p. 1. Similarly, in December 15 1998, Henry Blodget, another high profile Internet analyst, issued a 
$400 price tag for Amazon then valued at 60% ($242/share) of that figure. He justified this on the basis of 
its “astounding revenue momentum” and what he saw as its potential to become the Wal-Mart of the Web 
taking 10% of its target market.  Assuming a profit margin of 7% (Amazon was making increasingly heavy 
losses at the time) it would then, on a P/E multiple of 30, be worth $21bn or $400 a share.  Less than a 
month after this prediction, Amazon.com’s stock actually topped $400. 
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the “phantastic object” that a girl child achieves holding a doll or a boy child achieves by 
wearing a policeman’s helmet or his team’s football shirt. They feel they are mother or father. 
In this way valuation in the bubble was based on unconscious identification and possession of 
a phantastic object: it was, therefore, at bottom, based on an emotional sense of Internet stock 
value and its capacity to transform the investor not on a cognitive calculation of return. In 
that heady atmosphere justifications of valuation procedures were rationalisations of wishes.  
 
3. Keeping stock values high: the stage of defence 
“Phantastic objects” are too fantastic to be so in material reality. In psychic reality, however, 
there is no particular difficulty about being able to carry on life dominated by imaginary or 
“phantastic” beliefs for quite extended periods of time. In its most extreme form it is what is 
happening in psychiatrically diagnosed madness and in lesser forms it is the basis for many 
neurotic problems.  
 
Psychoanalysts have devoted much effort to a description of defences against reality (for 
instance, Sandler and Freud, 1985). Individuals have available sophisticated and themselves 
very satisfying unconscious mental mechanisms that can be used to shut out and modify bad 
news. They can, for instance “turn a blind eye” mentally (denial); see only one side (the 
bright side, splitting); or see a problem somewhere else (projection). As time goes by an 
increasing number of such defences will be necessary to maintain any phantasy belief that is 
manifestly at odds with the perception of reality, such as the accounting realities of 
price/earnings ratios, etc. However, the belief that a share certificate in which one has 
emotionally and financially invested heavily and which is believed to have the transforming 
qualities of the “phantastic object” is a belief that cannot be dropped without the consequence 
of mental pain. To avoid this an investment analyst who suggested such to investors could 
expect to be “dealt with” in a number of ways. His presentation of accounting reality could be 
countered by suggestions that he does not understand “new” situation, is perhaps envious and 
because he has not invested is surely suffering from “sour grapes”. He could then be treated 
with contempt and then (so long as all went well for a bit) investors could sleep easy and 
carry on behaving as they felt compelled to do so anyway. Freud (1908) states that "hardly 
anything is harder for a man than to give up a pleasure which he has once experienced.  
Actually, we can never give anything up; we only exchange one thing for another" (p. 145). 
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There were many occasions during the dot.com bubble when commentators did in fact 
question the assumptions and expectations implicit in the pricing price of Internet stock and, 
especially when these were associated with negative gyrations in prices, such articles 
provided opportunities for those involved to reflect. But they did not. When doubt was 
expressed there is clear evidence it was ignored or even denigrated. For instance, On April 
15, 1996 Fortune published a cover story “How Crazy is this Market?” arguing a 
“confidence-shattering crash” was inevitable at some point and, 15 months later, in 1997, 
with the Dow 2,000 points higher, it ran another sceptical cover story. The Economist (April 
18, 1998) and the Financial Times (April 22, 1998) already questioned what was happening 
and describing the US as experiencing a serious asset price bubble called on Alan Greenspan 
to take action. There were other distinguished doubters23. But in response to the Financial 
Times the New York Times published an editorial defending the nation’s amour-propre (April 
29, 1998) and Newsweek dismissively poked fun at The Economist article (May 11, 1998).  
 
Undaunted and a year later, The Economist (January 30 1999, “Why Internet shares will fall”) 
was quite explicit about Internet companies: “…however exciting the Internet may be, retail 
and content companies will never make enough money to justify today’s share prices ....Once 
normal valuations fly out of the window, there are no reference points. (italics added)  Nor 
does anyone know how the day traders will cope with sustained downward pressure.  Internet 
shares are not liquid and online brokerages may not be able to handle large volumes of 
stock.” It was, however, well over another year before this view gained attention with any 
consequence. 
 
In fact analysts and other commentators kept advising investors to keep buying and kept 
dismissing alternative views.  Comparing the dot.com market with tulip mania, Mary Meeker 
wrote: “The difference is that real values are being created.  Tulip bulbs would not 
fundamentally change the way the companies do business.”24 Another analyst was still more 
effusive on this point: “The overall Internet stock phenomenon may well be a ‘bubble’ but in 
at least one respect it is very different from other bubbles:  there are great fundamental 
                                            
23  The distinguished economist, Milton Friedman, told the New Yorker (August 17, 1998) “I think there is a 
good deal of comparison between the market in 1929 and the market today ….I think both of them are 
bubbles ...if anything, I suspect there is more of a bubble in today’s market than there was in 1929.”  
Similarly another Nobel Laureate, Paul Samuelson, was equally blunt “...there has been an element of bluff 
in the market for at least two years, possibly longer...(Greenspan had) painted himself into a corner.  He is 
now dealing with the physics of avalanches.” (Cassidy 2002, p. 183). 
24  (Cassidy, 2002 p. 217). 
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reasons to own these stocks ....The companies underneath are (1) growing amazingly quickly, 
and (2) threatening the status quo in multiple sectors of the economy ….With these types of 
investments, we would also argue that the ‘real’ risk is not losing some money – it is missing 
a much bigger upside.”25     
 
Of course, the emotional cost of realising one may have made a mistake becomes greater as 
realisation promises more of a fall. Realisation threatens to release many feelings. At first 
these may only be noticeable in the form of increasing anxiety but also perhaps signified by 
particularly spectacular spurts of optimistic assessments or an increasingly strident tone of 
dismissal such as those just mentioned. 
 
In summary, while the market was in the grip of the pursuit of the phantastic object twin 
factors seemed to have operated to continue to propel it up.  On the one hand it was driven by 
infectious excitement. On the other, specific defences against perception in the form of denial 
or splitting were operating to attack and to prevent awareness of more material reality.  It is a 
clinical maxim that awareness of being just ordinary in an excited manic state is unwelcome 
to the point of being terrifying. It is felt to threaten a complete depressive collapse and panic. 
It threatens the loss of the phantastic object as well as anxiety about what has been done in 
the frantic effort to possess it.  If the bubble bursts there will be pain in the form of loss, 
humiliation and shame.   
 
In the euphoric stage of the bubble we suppose these potentially painful feelings and anything 
or anyone stirring them up were quite literally to be hated. It is this hatred that leads to the 
manic contempt and dismissal of sceptical analysts or commentators who are felt to be 
seeking to deny the value of the phantastic object structure and trying to spoil the party in the 
process.  The process is inimical to thought. 
 
4. The collapse: Panic and loss  
What finally pricked the bubble was a long article in Barrons on March 18 2000, 8 days after 
the Dow Jones Internet Index all-time high, entitled “Burning up”. The conclusion was that at 
least a quarter would run out of cash within a year26. 
                                            
25  Henry Blodget, Internet/Electronic Commerce Report, Merrill Lynch, March 9, 1999. 
26  We do not see once predict this moment but such mental states do have something of the quality of the 
dizziness we all experience as we feel exposed to being too far above the ground.  
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 The realisation, when it finally occurs, that a phantastic object is not what it was felt to be 
creates panic and other undesirable feelings that all of us experienced much earlier in life and 
have had to work hard and to be helped to overcome. The feelings may include a shameful 
feeling one has been metaphorically soiling one’s hands.  The immediate emotional 
consequence for many investors would be that they will fell compelled to wash their hands of 
their situation and to try to get rid of the pieces of paper.  
 
The rapidity of the collapse in the Internet index after the bursting of the bubble is exactly 
consistent with these expectations – the phantastic object no longer had its previous meaning 
and there was no other logic to hold the situation. The stock became a source of 
embarrassment and those publicly involved with it seem to have become soiled. 
 
Insofar as repressing any memory of one’s excited possession is impossible in the face of 
stark material reality, there is likely to be shame and guilt, with the desire to find someone 
else to blame for the losses and the associated painful bad feelings engendered.   The 
combination of the desire to dump and the anger about feeling let down, generates 
helplessness, shame and guilt and particularly hatred of the object that let one down.  We 
believe this kind of scenario explains the emotional tone of the very negative and dismissive 
“wise after the event” comments occurring after the collapse of the dot.com bubble27.  
 
Whereas at the height of the bubble no one seemed to take much notice of adverse comment, 
once the bubble was burst no one seemed to take much notice of good news either. Thus, 
after the crash Internet companies found it hard to raise money and the fantasy that it was 
possible to make easy money by buying and selling pieces of paper was seen as just that28. 
Activity turned to blame.  Spotting the next dot.com to go bankrupt became a popular 
spectator sport with websites encouraging users to submit predictions for the next dot.com 
                                            
27  The recent successful action by Eliot Spitzer, the New York Attorney General, against Merrill Lynch and 
other investment banks for their excesses in the technology boom which were blamed for heavy investor 
losses, can be viewed in this light.   
28  As an indication the moral climate during and after the bubble it interesting that when after the fall Henry 
Blodget changed his tune, the tone of his language remained the same - although targeted in quite an 
opposite direction. In private (Financial Times April 10, 2002), he apparently described four Internet stocks 
he was recommending publicly as alternatively “a powder keg” (July 13, 2000), as in such shape that “we 
see nothing that will turn this around near-term” (October 6, 2000), a “piece of shit” (October 10, 2000) and 
similarly “POS” (December 4, 2000). 
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failure.  The New York Post actually created a “dead dot.com of the day” column and a 
website was set up to preserve the home pages of deceased dot.coms, 
www.disobey.com\ghostsites to ensure they didn’t vanish without trace.29,30  
 
We would hypothesise a parallel process by Internet companies of divestment of such 
stigmatised association, now the bubble has burst. Just as in the boom period adding a “.com” 
suffix to a company name had a sharply positive effect on its subsequent market valuation the 
same attribution would be likely to have a reverse effect after the fall. In fact in 2001 
Internet.com, a publishing company, changed its name to INT Media Group. Since going 
public in June 1999 its stock had gone from $14 to $72 then back to $4.  “We have been the 
whipping boy because of the name” its founder complained to the Wall Street Journal. (Wall 
Street Journal April 15, 2000, quoted in Cassidy, 2002, p. 308).  Business Week, (“What’s in 
a Name”, October 29, 2001) lists several such publicly quoted companies removing their 
.com suffixes, replacing these with Inc. or Corp. or changing their names more radically. It is 
such observations that make us suppose that with Internet stocks we were dealing with a 
“phantastic object”; why should changing a name have such a significant impact on share 
valuation when any kind of actual link is tenuous in the extreme? 
 
5. Learning From Experience 
Freud and later psychoanalysts have argued that unconscious impulses, taking the form of 
attempts to enact phantasy, are part of everyone's reality. If we do not defensively evade the 
reality of these impulses, we will eventually confront their consequences, and experience the 
fear and the guilt, which necessarily follow from them.  The dot.com investor holding shares 
at the time of the fall, inevitably, through the unconscious greedy pursuit of the phantastic 
object and the surrounding beliefs of becoming and overthrowing the established order of 
reality, would, when the bubble burst, face unconscious shame and guilt, revealed when the 
consequences of his actions become losses.  
 
                                            
29  Paul Andrews “The Virtual Dead Live on in Museum of Web Failures” International Herald Tribune, May 
25, 2001 p. 13.  
30  Investors who, in many cases, had lost very large sums of money in dot.com speculation kept a very low 
profile. Fortune wound up its Dot-com Deathwatch monitoring in December 2001 after listing 384 
dot.coms which had filed for bankruptcy or ceased operations in that year.  The reason given was that 
Internet startups have become a relic of the 1990s. (Ellen Florian: “Dead and (Mostly) Gone”, Fortune, 
December 24, 2001, p. 46) 
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One reaction to the situation is to feel persecuted. If such anxieties predominate, it will be 
difficult to face reality except by seeking to project the blame and to persecute and take 
revenge on someone else. A second reaction is depressive: to accept loss experience and to 
give up the “phantastic” dream.  If feelings of loss can be tolerated and understood then 
mourning can take place which ushers in the experiences and allows the development of new 
capacities which Melanie Klein described under the heading of the depressive position 
(Klein, 1935).  The overvalued  “phantastic” beliefs can be relinquished by being mourned as 
lost objects – a process that is linked with realising and tolerating the distinction between 
what is mental and what is material (Britton, 1995). Mourning involves a drive to make 
reparation. In this way, if the experience is not eviscerated, growth and learning is made 
possible. 
 
Psychoanalytical theory, therefore, suggests that it is important when the consequences of the 
kind overvaluation process that took place in the dot.com affair are revealed, that they should 
be “worked through”31so that they can be learned from, leading to modification of subsequent 
investor behaviour, or not, as the case may be.  It is an important guiding principle of the 
proper functioning of markets that investors should learn – in traditional economic theory it is 
by learning that the market keeps to sound maximisation principles – so that any barriers to 
doing so matter.  
 
If a lesson is not learned there is the danger of repetition and in this context, if the idea of 
Internet stock as “phantastic object” is used, it will help to focus on some of the compulsive 
difficulties that are likely. The feeling of being cheated by reality may fester and so create the 
conditions for a new search driven unconsciously by the desire to undo the humiliation, guilt, 
shame and hurt – to clear one’s name or to get back at and take revenge on those who are felt 
to have cheated one of one’s prize.  
 
It is, as yet, too early to say how far investors and their advisors have reacted to the dot.com 
experience by learning from experience, although the signs are not good. The primary 
activity at present appears to be an attempt to lie low and to project the blame and to 
persecute those felt responsible – in others word to try and wash hands for getting caught up 
in what in retrospect was a frightening, shaming and damaging experience for all but a few. 
                                            
31  See Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973: 488. 
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 6.  Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we have suggested that those caught up in the dot.com phenomenon can usefully 
be understood as driven by compelling, exciting and then terrifying and shameful emotions 
which dominated their thoughts and of which they were only partly aware. Their thinking and 
behaviour seems to have been manifestly at variance with that associated with homo 
economicus and may be better understood in terms of a parallel and equally purposive mean-
ends schema, making sense from the investor’s viewpoint, but defined by their subjective or, 
psychoanalytically speaking their psychic, reality.  
 
In setting out a five step understanding of the dot.com affair in terms of psychic reality we 
have introduced a number of core psychoanalytic concepts and argued that during the 
dot.com bubble there was an exceptional degree of distortion in valuation realities into which 
it was very difficult not to get drawn and to which investors cling tenaciously by “falling for” 
more and more unrealistic theses. During this period normal accounting realities became 
suspended while those who raised doubts about the valuations achieved were triumphantly 
mocked and denigrated. There was an enormously exciting atmosphere in which there was a 
curiously excited moral tone – both in the claims first made for the Internet and the new 
economy and then in the denigration of the companies afterwards. In our view these features 
are striking and consistent with the idea that in inner psychic reality Internet stocks became 
mentally represented as infantile “phantastic” objects. We believe this idea and the associated 
quality of perverse hidden intergenerational (Oedipal) rivalry help to explain in a consistent 
manner core characteristics of the exciting rise and the dramatic fall in stocks, as well as the 
apparently phobic way the sector has subsequently been treated.  
 
Phantastic objects are unconsciously idealised and then, on letting one down, denigrated. One 
consequence of understanding Internet stocks as phantastic objects is that it points to the need 
for the market community to attend to these matters and to acknowledge and emotionally 
understand what has happened, lest by treating the experience as unpleasant and best 
forgotten, there is an institutional as well as individual failure to learn from experience.  
 
Such ideas, although perhaps strange to the finance literature, seem to us to be worth a more 
empirical investigation. Although like other ideas from behavioural finance they focus on 
hypothesised aspects of the process of individual decision-making, they do aim to address 
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particular aggregate outcomes of great significance for understanding how markets can 
significantly depart from equilibrium in the medium term (Keynes’ “animal spirits”). 
Moreover, the dot.com experience, like the earlier South Sea bubble which had highly 
restrictive legislative consequences, may exert a considerable impact on investor confidence 
for some time to come. There are already signs that it is leading to a fundamental alteration in 
the rules governing investment banks as the recent agreement between the New York 
Attorney General and Merrill Lynch and the parallel attention of the SEC demonstrate! 
 
We also suggest that while the dot.com experience is a dramatic example of how valuations 
are driven more by emotion than cognition, that knowledge of the subtle and complex way 
emotions determine psychic reality will be of ongoing use in understanding all investor 
behaviour. It has long been recognised that markets are driven by greed and fear: the 
psychoanalytic theory of psychic reality provides a complex systematic model with which to 
begin to investigate and more systematically understand and apprehend these phenomena.
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